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The History of the Subsidiarity Principle in the 
Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption 
 
Chad Turner* 
Recognizing that intercountry adoption may offer the advantage of a permanent 
family to a child for whom a suitable family cannot be found in his or her State 
of origin… 
An adoption within the scope of the Convention shall take place only if the 
competent authorities of the State of origin -… 
b) have determined, after possibilities for placement of the child within the State 
of origin have been given due consideration, that an intercountry adoption is in 
the child's best interests;…  
 
Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of Children and Co-operation in 
Respect of Intercountry Adoption (the Hague Convention)1 	  	  
INTRODUCTION 
 It has been over 20 years since the Convention of 29 May 1993 on 
Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (the 
Hague Convention) was drafted. Since then, 95 States have ratified or acceded to 
the Hague Convention,2 with more expected to ratify in the coming years.3 
Among the many important principles laid out in the Hague Convention, perhaps 
none is as widely debated as the subsidiarity principle, set forth in the Preamble 
and Article 4(b) (quoted above). The subsidiarity principle, should, in theory, 
help States understand the hierarchy of placement for children. In other words, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* JD/LLM in International and Comparative Law 2015, Duke University School of Law. I 
express my thanks to Professor Kathryn Bradley for her encouragement and assistance in 
writing this article. I am also appreciative of my colleagues at the Hague Conference on 
Private International Law during my time there for their support and teaching. 
1 Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry 
Adoption, May 29, 1993, Preamble and Art. 4(b), S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-51. 
2 Status Table of Contracting States, 33: Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of 
Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=69 (last visited Sep. 12, 
2015). 
3 See e.g., Press Release of the Government of the Republic of Ghana, Cabinet Approves 
Memoranda on Child Adoption and Others (2015) available at 
http://www.ghana.gov.gh/images/documents/four_memos.pdf (signaling Ghana’s intent 
to become a contracting State to the Hague Convention). 
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the issue is whether intercountry adoption should be viewed as subsidiary to 
domestic care options, and if so, which domestic options. 
 Many of those involved in the debate have relied on explanatory reports 
of the Hague Convention, studies in fields other than law, anecdotal evidence, or 
a combination of these and other evidence to support their views on the 
subsidiarity principle. Despite the availability of the drafting history of the Hague 
Convention, relatively little attention has been paid to what the drafters of the 
Hague Convention intended the subsidiarity principle to be or the evolution of 
the principle during its drafting. 
 Through a detailed analysis of the drafting history of the subsidiarity 
principle, paying particular attention to what was included and what was not, one 
can learn a great deal about how the subsidiarity principle should actually be 
applied. The principle, as will be shown, is really about families: children 
deserve families; children need families; children should be in permanent 
families whenever possible. Such views of children and families influenced the 
drafting of the subsidiarity principle and should likewise influence the 
interpretation and implementation of the principle today. 
I. THE SUBSIDIARITY PRINCIPLE	  
A. What is Subsidiarity? 
 Subsidiarity is a concept that dates back at least 200 years and, in general 
terms, means that problems should first be dealt with at a local level.4 It is in 
some respects a principle of decentralization with the larger authority taking a 
subsidiary role and allowing the localized authority to respond to the needs of 
those closest to it. It is a principle that is commonly evoked in international law 
settings.5 
 In the context of intercountry adoption, the parallel to the local level in 
decision-making is the biological family. The biological family has the priority 
and the right to raise their children. However, the issue with subsidiarity in the 
intercountry adoption context centers on who should raise a child if the biological 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See Subsidiarity, WIKIPEDIA (October 10, 2015) (explaining subsidiarity’s roots in 
Catholicism and its wide application to everything from military and government 
operations to neuropsychology and cybernetics), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subsidiarity 
(last visited Sep. 12, 2015). 
5 See e.g., Andreas Follesdal, The Principle of Subsidiarity as a Constitutional Principle 
in International Law, 2 GLOBAL CONST. 37 (2013). 
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family cannot. The hierarchy of options, both domestic and international, for the 
raising of a child in the event the biological family cannot is thus the central 
focus of those studying and implementing the subsidiarity principle. 
B. The Debate over Subsidiarity in the Hague Convention 
 Although international law is full of contested issues and debated topics, 
none may be as fundamental in its sphere–or as hotly contested–as the principle 
of subsidiarity vis-à-vis intercountry adoption. Establishing a certain view of this 
principle is crucial because it dictates how, why, and perhaps most importantly, 
when intercountry adoptions should take place. Proponents and opponents of 
intercountry adoption argue fiercely about the meaning of subsidiarity,6 but, even 
amongst themselves, proponents of intercountry adoption do not agree on exactly 
what subsidiarity is. 
 The debate about subsidiarity is best captured by two main views (all 
other views tending to be variants of these two). Elizabeth Bartholet is a well-
known advocate for one view; which promotes “no preference” for an in-country 
placement, including domestic adoption, over intercountry adoption.7 This is 
because the best interests of the child are the controlling principle when 
considering a child’s welfare and thus an expression of preference negates the 
best interests principle.8 Under Bartholet’s view, the notion that intercountry 
adoption should be viewed as a “last resort” is unreservedly incorrect.9 Bartholet 
strongly advocates for concurrent planning, meaning that domestic adoption and 
intercountry adoption are pursued simultaneously with a child being placed 
internationally if a domestic adoption is unavailable.10 
 David Smolin is also well known in the intercountry adoption context 
and takes a somewhat opposing, “pro-country” view. Smolin maintains that when 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Unfortunately, a glance at a simple dictionary does little to resolve the debate. However, 
subsidiarity as “the state of being subsidiary” with subsidiary subsequently defined as “of 
secondary importance” is illustrative to a certain extent. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S 
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1245 (11th ed. 2003) also available at http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/subsidiary.  
7 ELIZABETH BARTHOLET & DAVID SMOLIN, THE DEBATE in INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION: 
POLICIES, PRACTICES, AND OUTCOMES 236 (Judith L. Gibbons & Karen Smith Rotabi 
eds., 2012). 
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 234.  
10 Id. at 237. Bartholet recognizes that the Hague Convention expresses preference for a 
domestic adoption over an intercountry adoption, but expresses concern about delay and 
children languishing in institutions if both options are not pursued concurrently. 
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family preservation and reunification efforts are unsuccessful, domestic adoption 
certainly trumps intercountry adoption.11 Likewise, domestic placements that are 
short of a legal, permanent family, such as foster care or institutional care, may 
come before intercountry adoption.12 Under this view, such placements may be 
particularly appropriate when taking into account the language, culture, 
nationality, and age of the child.13 
 Bartholet’s view relies heavily on the assumption that the best interests 
of a child will predominately direct that the child be in a permanent family (with 
full legal rights and obligations).14 Bartholet emphasizes the need for family and 
certainty that adoption provides over alternative forms of care,15 whereas Smolin 
believes the best interests of a child may include a multitude of factors that can 
outweigh placement in a permanent family for an individual child.16 Smolin 
emphasizes family, but primarily in the context of family reunification and 
preservation, as opposed to placing an emphasis on finding a new family for a 
child if those measures fail.17 
 Perhaps as the impetus for such debate, the principle of subsidiarity is 
not clearly defined in the Hague Convention18 or elsewhere. Language in itself is 
inherently ambiguous and thus terms like “permanent,” “suitable family,” 
“possibilities for placement,” and “due consideration,” which appear in the text 
of the Hague Convention,19 only fuel the debate. The waters are further muddied 
by differing concepts of the term “family” and “adoption.” Where non-nuclear 
family structures are common or adoption is only a temporary situation,20 the 
correct interpretation of subsidiarity may be even more difficult to elucidate. 
Ultimately however, international legislation, like all other forms of legislation, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Id. at 241. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 236. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 241–42. 
17 Id. at 242. 
18 Supra note 1. 
19 Id. at Preamble, Art. 4(b). 
20  See, e.g., JINI L. ROBY & TRISH MASKEW, HUMAN RIGHTS CONSIDERATIONS IN 
INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION: THE CHILDREN AND FAMILIES OF CAMBODIA AND MARSHALL 
ISLANDS in INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION: POLICIES, PRACTICES, AND OUTCOMES 62 (Judith 
L. Gibbons & Karen Smith Rotabi eds., 2012) (noting that the majority of mothers in 
Marshall Islands did not understand the finality of adoptions). 
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relies on such ambiguities to generate buy-in from a sufficient number of 
participants to ensure that the agreed upon rules will be broadly implemented. 
 Other international documents also contain references to the subsidiarity 
principle,21 the most influential of these being the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child.22 Article 21 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child recognizes 
“that inter-country adoption may be considered as an alternative means of child's 
care, if the child cannot be placed in a foster or an adoptive family or cannot in 
any suitable manner be cared for in the child's country of origin.”23 In contrast, 
the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption contains different language 
seeming to purposefully omit any reference to foster care as an alternative to be 
considered before intercountry adoption as well as rejecting the concept of 
“suitable care” in favor of “suitable family.”24 As will be shown, this difference 
in language is purposeful and illustrative of the fact that the drafters of the Hague 
Convention recognized a need to establish the concept of permanent families for 
children as fulfilling the best interests of the child. 
 The differences between these two conventions and their significance, as 
well as linguistic ambiguities and cultural differences have been discussed at 
great lengths. 25  However, there is still an incomplete understanding of 
subsidiarity. This may be due, in part, to the fact that little attention has been paid 
to the drafting history of the Hague Convention and the development of the 
subsidiarity principle during the course of drafting. A firm understanding of the 
origins and evolution of the subsidiarity principle in the Hague Convention can, 
to a certain extent, help resolve the debate over what “subsidiarity” truly means. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 See G.A. Res. 41/85, Art. 17, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/85 (Dec. 3, 1986); European 
Parliament Res. A4-0392/1996, pars. C & G (Nov. 22, 1996) (both containing language 
that makes intercountry adoption subsidiary to domestic placements, including foster 
care). 
22 Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (Nov. 20, 1989). 
23 Id. at Art. 21(b). 
24 Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry 
Adoption, supra note 1, at Preamble, Art. 4(b). 
25 See e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet, Ratification by the United States of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child: Pros and Cons from a Child’s Rights Perspective 633 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 1, 18 (2011) (persuasively discussing the differences between the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Hague Convention, with particular regard 
to the subsidiarity principle in both conventions). 
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II.  THE HISTORY OF SUBSIDIARITY IN THE HAGUE 
CONVENTION ON INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION 
 
A. Right to a Family and Best Interests 
 The right to a family and the principle of best interests are two 
overarching principles that set the tone for the Hague Convention on Intercountry 
Adoption. In 1990, Hans Van Loon, at that time a lawyer with the Permanent 
Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private International Law,26 wrote a report27 
on intercountry adoption that served as one of the primary background 
documents for the drafters of what would become the Hague Convention on 
Intercountry Adoption. Van Loon noted that inklings of subsidiarity can be traced 
as far back as nearly 1800 years B.C. where law held that “before a man can 
adopt a foundling he must look for the child’s parents and if he finds them must 
restore the child to them.”28 This same text also serves as an illustration of the 
importance of family and its far-reaching roots. In a report following the 
adoption of the Hague Convention, it is noted that “the right to a family is a 
fundamental right,” demonstrating the enduring perception of the importance of 
family.29 
 The right of a child to a permanent family30 heavily influenced the 
formation of the Hague Convention and remains a very important consideration 
in the workings of the Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference.31 The right of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 In 1996 Van Loon began service as the Secretary General of the Hague Conference; a 
post he held until 2013. He is often referred to as the “father” of the Hague Convention 
on Intercountry Adoption. 
27 See PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTEENTH SESSION 10 TO 29 MAY 1993, TOME II, 
ADOPTION-CO-OPERATION 15–101, (ed. Permanent Bureau of the Conference, 1994). 
28 Id. at 27 (discussing the Codex Hammurabi). 
29 Id. at 553. 
30 Although the term “permanent family” is also subject to significant debate, the 
assumption is that a permanent family is one in which children and parents enjoy full 
legal rights and obligations towards each other. Otherwise any situation that could 
plausibly be called a “family”, including foster families, group homes, and some 
institutions could also be labeled as permanent insomuch as a child in that situation is 
unlikely to ever leave such care. See e.g., California Department of Social Services, 
Adoption FAQs, http://www.childsworld.ca.gov/pg1302.htm (noting that “[a]doption is a 
legal process which permanently gives parental rights to adoptive parents” and 
“[a]doption is the permanent legal assumption of all parental rights and responsibilities 
for a child. Adoptive parents have the same legal rights and responsibilities as parents 
whose children are born to them”). 
31 See LAURA MARTÍNEZ-MORA, HANNAH BAKER & EMMANUELLE HARANG, THE 1993 
HAGUE INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION CONVENTION AND SUBSIDIARITY: IS THE 
SUBSIDIARITY PRINCIPLE STILL “FIT FOR PURPOSE”? in A COMMITMENT TO PRIVATE 
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a child to a family shares an interconnected relationship with the best interests 
principle since a child in a permanent family is likely having his or her best 
interests met32 and it is in the best interests of a child to be in a permanent family 
whenever possible. 
 The principle of the best interests of the child is a complimentary 
principle to the right to a family. Both ideas are contained in the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child, where it is declared that in situations of intercountry 
adoption the best interests of the child should be “the paramount 
consideration.”33 The best interests principle thus must guide all actions in 
intercountry adoptions and should be a primary factor in any child welfare 
decision.34 Unfortunately, in the lexicon of intercountry adoptions it has become 
commonplace to assert that domestic care options should be implemented before 
international options35 and intercountry adoption should “only be implemented if 
it is in the best interests of the child.”36 Such emphasis ignores the fact that 
domestic options must also be in the best interests of the child37 and incorrectly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF HANS VAN LOON 344 (2013) (noting the 
importance of ensuring “that children are raised in permanent families”). The Permanent 
Bureau of the Hague Conference is tasked not only with helping to draft conventions, but 
also with assisting with the implementation of conventions through publishing documents 
(in this context referred to as Guides to Good Practice), reporting to Member States on 
developments with conventions, promoting the adoption of conventions insofar as 
possible, and holding Special Commission, working group, and other meetings that allow 
experts from Contracting States to discuss ways to improve cooperation and 
implementation of conventions. 
32 There are certainly exceptions, such as abusive and neglectful families. However, that 
does not mean that a child from a home of abuse and neglect would necessarily be better 
off in a non-family setting. 
33 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 22, at Art. 21. Also, the Preamble 
talks extensively about the importance of the family. 
34 This included domestic child welfare decisions. 
35 This hierarchy of domestic care options and international options being one of the most 
common framings of the subsidiarity principle. 
36 MARTÍNEZ-MORA, BAKER & HARANG, supra note 31, at 343 (stating that “[o]nly after 
due consideration has been given to national solutions should intercountry adoption be 
considered, and then only if it is in the child’s best interests”). 
37  See e.g., CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, DETERMINING THE BEST 
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (2012) (noting that whenever a court makes a decision about a 
child, including adoption and placement it “must weigh whether its decision will be in the 
“best interests” of the child”) and AUSTRALIA DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITIES CHILD 
SAFETY AND DISABILITY SERVICES, POLICY: THE WELLBEING AND BEST INTERESTS OF 
THE CHILD IN ADOPTION (2013), 
http://www.communities.qld.gov.au/resources/childsafety/adoption/wellbeing-best-
interest-child-adoption-626.rtf (stating that the wellbeing and best interests of an adopted 
child “are paramount considerations in all adoption matters”). 
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implies (perhaps unintentionally) that international solutions are less likely to 
comply with the best interests principle. The scope of the Hague Convention 
does not extend beyond intercountry adoptions to the realm of domestic 
adoptions and thus it would be inappropriate for the Convention to mandate 
procedures in domestic adoptions. Nonetheless, the best interests of the child 
standard is the same standard imposed in both domestic and intercountry 
adoptions and in both cases placement with a permanent family is most likely to 
be in the best interests of the child. 
 Of fundamental importance is the fact that the driving force behind the 
Hague Convention is the best interests principle and not the subsidiarity 
principle. However, the proper implementation of the subsidiarity principle will 
fulfill the best interests principle.38 In the largely unsuccessful first Hague treaty 
on intercountry adoptions in 1965, international adoptions were not to be granted 
unless “in the interest of the child.”39 The Convention on the Rights of the Child 
and the Declaration on the Rights of the Child similarly espouse the best interests 
of the child as a principle of great importance.40 From the very beginning of its 
drafting, all the way through its final adoption, the Hague Convention also placed 
emphasis on the best interests principle. In its initial illustrative draft articles, the 
first objective of the Hague Convention was noted as establishing “safeguards to 
ensure that intercountry adoption takes place in the best interests of the child.”41 
Although not retained in the same language, the final version of the treaty also 
declares its conviction that adoptions should take place “in the best interests of 
the child.”42 The Permanent Bureau’s Guide to Good Practice No. 1, a post-hoc 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38  See CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, supra note 37 (discussing the 
importance of family and permanency in determining the best interests of the child). No 
child welfare advocate has been found to reasonably argue that children are better off in 
domestic foster care or institutional care than in a domestic adoptive placement, with 
reasonable exceptions for special situations. 
39 Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Recognition of Decrees Relating to 
Adoptions, Nov. 15, 1965, 4 I.L.M. 338 (1965). 
40 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 22, at Art. 21; G.A. Res. 1386(XIV), 
principle 3 (Nov. 20, 1959). 
41 PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTEENTH SESSION 10 TO 29 MAY 1993, supra note 27, at 
137. 
42 Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry 
Adoption, supra note 1, at Preamble. “Convinced of the necessity to take measures to 
ensure that intercountry adoptions are made in the best interests of the child and with 
respect for his or her fundamental rights, and to prevent the abduction, the sale of, or 
traffic in children.” 
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analysis and interpretation of the Hague Convention, confirms that the best 
interests principle is the “overarching principle” of the Convention and not the 
subsidiarity principle.43 
 With the understanding that the best interest principle and the right to a 
family are overarching principles that heavily influenced the drafting of the 
Hague Convention, an analysis of the evolution of the subsidiarity principle 
within the Hague Convention itself can be better understood. From these two 
precepts stems a marked transition of the subsidiarity principle towards a family-
focused principle that embraces permanency as being in the best interests of the 
child.44 
B. Preamble  
Within the Hague Convention, the concept of subsidiarity is mentioned 
twice, once in the Preamble and once in Article 4 b).45 Surprisingly, the Preamble 
underwent significant change in the course of its drafting, whereas Article 4 b) 
remained essentially unchanged from the early stages of its drafting. Although 
some may be quick to discount preambles, objective statements, and chapeaus in 
international instruments, there is little doubt that the subsidiarity principle 
contained in the Preamble of the Hague Convention should be looked to as doing 
a great share of work in defining subsidiarity. Such a view is consistent with 
accepted methods of treaty interpretation.46 
The history of the preamble paragraph on subsidiarity involves multiple 
iterations, significant debate, and a great deal of interaction between countries 
present at the drafting of the Convention. The third paragraph of the Preamble 
was largely the product of a proposal by Colombia and Bolivia intended to 
ensure that the fundamental right of a child to a family was protected.47 Despite 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE IMPLEMENTATION AND 
OPERATION OF THE 1993 INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION CONVENTION: GUIDE TO GOOD 
PRACTICE 114 (2008). 
44 Id. (explaining that a permanent home, even abroad, is preferable to a temporary one). 
45 See supra note 1 for the exact language of both the Preamble and Article 4(b) as it 
relates to subsidiarity. 
46 See e.g., G.G. Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of 
Justice: Treaty Interpretation and Certain Other Treaty Points 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT. L. 1, 10 
(1951) (conceding that a preamble “does not and should not have direct operative force,” 
but at the same time pointing out that it is an important guide reflecting the spirit in 
which the treaty is to be read and the purpose and objectives of the treaty). 
47 PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTEENTH SESSION 10 TO 29 MAY 1993, supra note 27, at 
553. 
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multiple opportunities to introduce the concepts of alternative care, foster care, or 
institutionalization as coming before intercountry adoption in the hierarchy of 
subsidiarity, the drafters consistently rejected such proposals48 in favor of a more 
family oriented document.49 Ultimately, the adopted Preamble embodies the idea 
that subsidiarity means “the placement of a child in a family including in 
intercountry adoption, is the best option among all forms of alternative care, in 
particular to be preferred over institutionalization” (emphasis added).50 
 Despite conclusions drawn from a Special Commission in June of 
1990,51 the tentative draft of the Convention quickly did away with the concept 
found in the Convention on the Rights of the Child that foster care should come 
before intercountry adoption. 52  This early version of the Preamble read: 
“Recognizing that intercountry adoption may offer the advantage of a permanent 
family to a child who cannot in any suitable manner be cared for in his or her 
country of origin.”53 The omission of a specific reference to foster care as being a 
“suitable manner” was mentioned in the explanatory notes and the reporter 
indicated that this omission was because some of the comments to the draft 
indicated such language was controversial.54 Although the reporter claims that 
the language of the tentative draft retains the essence of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child,55 particular attention must be paid to what subsequently 
occurred in the drafting history while remembering that reports and explanatory 
notes are in themselves subsidiary to the actual text.56 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Id at 247, 472. 
49 Id. at 553. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 129. The Conclusions stated as a fundamental principle that “a child’s interests 
are in general best served if the child is raised by his or her own parents or, alternatively, 
by a foster or adoptive family in the child’s own country; intercountry adoption is to be 
seen as a solution of a subsidiary nature for ensuring the welfare of the child.” 
52 Id. at 151. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 159. What was “controversial” was not recorded in the explanatory report. 
However, presumably certain drafters felt that foster care was not a suitable form of care 
in this context and inclusion of foster care before intercountry adoption would violate the 
best interests principle. The further debates and proposals that took place during the 
drafting tend to corroborate this theory. 
55 Id. 
56 See Peter Hayes, The Legality and Ethics of Independent Intercountry Adoption Under 
the Hague Convention, 25 INT’L J. L., POL’Y & FAM. 288, 300 (2011) (indicating that the 
reporter’s views on certain issues may have been tainted. For example, “Parra-
Aranguren’s commentary can be seen as the first step in the campaign against 
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 The next iteration of the Convention was introduced at the Special 
Commission in 1992 as a preliminary draft.57 The language from the tentative 
draft was retained in full58 and the reporter again asserted that the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child was being followed in spirit if not in text.59 The reporter 
also noted that this version of the Preamble makes clear that “intercountry 
adoption is one possible alternative to take care of the child” and that 
intercountry adoption is subsidiary to a child being cared for by his or her own 
parents.60 Nonetheless, as the drafting of the Hague Convention progressed, the 
focus shifted from “caring” for a child to being driven by the concept of family. 
After the preliminary draft was introduced, States submitted comments to the 
draft. Although the term “permanent family” had been included in the 
Convention since the tentative draft,61 some of the comments about the Preamble 
focused on changing the concept of caring for a child to ensuring that a child 
grows up in a “family environment.”62 Poland proposed that the language about a 
child that cannot be raised in his home country be altered to indicate that the 
child should be placed in “une famille nourricière ou adoptive ou être 
convenablement élevé.”63 Poland’s proposal again illustrates a shift towards the 
idea of family rather than care, but ultimately this proposal to insert language 
about foster families failed. 
 Egypt also attempted to change the direction of the Convention’s 
thinking and its actual language. 64  Egypt commented that other forms of 
alternative care, including kafala,65 should have been included in the drafts of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
independent ICA under the Hague Convention. For having lost on the text of the 
Convention, the Permanent Bureau quickly realized that it could yet win on its 
interpretation”). 
57 PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTEENTH SESSION 10 TO 29 MAY 1993, supra note 27, at 
167. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 185. 
60 Id. at 187. 
61 Id. at 151. 
62 Id. at 247. Comment made by Sweden. 
63 Id. Quoted text translated: “a foster or adoptive family or be suitably raised.” 
64 Id. at 243. The delegate from Egypt submitted lengthy remarks calling for the 
Convention to recognize alternatives enshrined in Islamic Law and called for this 
“international codification effort” to “take into consideration all the elements and aspects 
of the matter to be codified, and the different legal systems in question.” 
65 Kafala most frequently involves caring for a child that is not part of the family caring 
for the child with the child retaining his or her biological family name and not taking on 
the name of the family caring for him or her. 
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Convention from the beginning.66 Egypt decried the drafters as ignoring the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child and neglecting to take into account 
national, cultural, and religious interests. 67  This comment provided one 
opportunity, of what would prove to be many, for the drafters to change course 
with the principle of subsidiarity. Ultimately, however, as was the case with 
Poland’s proposal, the concept of foster care and alternative care as being 
preferred over intercountry adoption was purposefully omitted from the 
Convention and language more oriented towards families was inserted. 
 Prior to distributing its proposed text, the drafting committee considered 
working documents submitted by delegates from the various countries. These 
working documents, including several about the Preamble,68 would serve as the 
basis for discussion and voting on changes to the text of the Convention. The 
proposed text distributed by the drafting committee proved to be a merger of the 
concept of care and the idea of family as it added two new paragraphs to the 
Preamble that were very focused on family. 69  These two new paragraphs 
underwent no substantial change before being adopted into the final version of 
the Hague Convention.70 Conversely, the first paragraph of the preliminary draft 
(which became the third paragraph in the working draft) remained the same at 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTEENTH SESSION 10 TO 29 MAY 1993, supra note 27, at 
243. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 296 (Colombia proposal to amend the first paragraph to “Recognizing that 
intercountry adoption may offer the advantage of a permanent family to a child who 
cannot find a suitable family in his or her country of origin”); id. at 298 (Colombia 
proposing to amend the Preamble to “Bearing in mind that a child, for the full and 
harmonious development of his or her personality, should grow up in a family 
environment”); id. at 304 (Indonesia partially concurring with a Swedish proposal that 
the Preamble should be changed to “Recalling that, as a priority, appropriate measures 
should be taken to enable children to remain in the care of their biological family; 
Bearing in mind that a child for the full and harmonious development of his or her 
personality, should grow up in a family environment and in an atmosphere of happiness, 
love and understanding” (internal references omitted)); id. at 319 (Egypt proposal to 
amend the Preamble to “Taking into account the other alternatives and forms of child 
care, e.g. foster placement and kafala as enshrined in Islamic law, and the need to 
promote international co-operation therein.”) (italics in original). 
69 Id. at 339. The paragraphs reading “Recognizing that the child, for the full and 
harmonious development of his or her personality, should grow up in a family 
environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding, Recalling that each 
country should take, as a matter of priority appropriate measures to enable the child to 
remain in the care of his or her family of origin.” 
70 See Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry 
Adoption, supra note 18, at Preamble (the only change being that of replacing the word 
“country” with the word “State” in the second paragraph of the Preamble). 
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this stage of the Convention,71 but would undergo significant change before the 
ultimate adoption of the Convention.72 
 The final text of the third paragraph in the Preamble expressing 
subsidiarity was the result of a joint proposal from Colombia and Bolivia, but 
only after an interesting evolution of votes and debate. On May 10, 1993, the 
drafters and delegates began reviewing the Convention and the working 
documents in order, starting with the Preamble.73 At the beginning of the first 
meeting, the chairman expressed to the delegates that the Hague Convention’s 
most important consideration was to benefit the adoptive child and reminded the 
delegates that “the Convention is intended to give a family to a child and not a 
child to a family.”74 The first point of substance that was raised was by the 
delegate from Colombia.75 She wished to change the Preamble’s wording of “in 
any suitable manner be cared for” to “find a suitable family,” pointing out that 
this modified language was intended to express the view that “intercountry 
adoption is a good option… …because it is an alternative advantageous to a child 
for whom a suitable family cannot be found domestically.”76 This initial attempt 
to alter the subsidiarity paragraph of the Preamble to have a greater family focus, 
although finding support from the Chilean and Chinese delegates, was voted 
down.77 
 In a later session, the delegate from Egypt returned to the Preamble and 
sought to change the language to indicate that alternatives short of domestic 
adoption should be recognized as appropriate. 78  The delegate stated that 
“[a]lthough these alternatives fall short of full legal adoption, they often provide 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTEENTH SESSION 10 TO 29 MAY 1993, supra note 27, at 
339. 
72 See Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry 
Adoption, supra note 18, at Preamble (the final text changing from “Recognizing that 
intercountry adoption may offer the advantage of a permanent family to a child who 
cannot in any suitable manner be cared for in his or her country of origin” to 
“Recognizing that intercountry adoption may offer the advantage of a permanent family 
to a child for whom a suitable family cannot be found in his or her State of origin.”). 





77 Id. at 356–57. Amongst those arguing against the Colombian proposal was a delegate 
from Greece who did not disagree with the proposal’s intent, but felt that the current 
language was broad enough to capture the view put forth by the Colombian delegate. 
78 Id. at 472. 
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for the same health, social and educational care as that of full adoption and they 
should be recognized.”79 Smolin, one of the foremost supporters of domestic 
options, even over permanent families, takes a surprisingly similar view.80 
However, no country was willing to support the Egyptian proposal and it 
consequently failed.81 The failure of this proposal, brought up for the second 
time, is a perfect illustration of the fact that the drafters of the Hague Convention 
did not intend subsidiarity to mean that care short of a permanent family should 
be considered ahead of intercountry adoption. The further evolution of the 
Preamble reinforces this conclusion. 
 Immediately after the failure of the Egyptian proposal, Indonesia 
proposed language that would eventually lead to the first and second paragraphs 
of the Preamble as finally adopted.82 The Austrian delegate then rose in support 
of a proposal by Colombia83 (which was identical to one of his own proposals) 
that underlined the importance of children growing up in a family environment.84 
The Colombian delegate again expressed her conviction that “a child [be] 
brought up within a family, whether that family be in the country of origin or in 
another State.”85 The delegate from Sweden affirmed his strong support for this 
same ideal.86 The delegate from the Holy See likewise expressed his support 
because of ambiguities in another part of the Convention and his belief that this 
proposal was supported by the Convention on the Rights of the Child.87 After a 
few further comments,88 including the Austrian delegate noting that the Preamble 
“would be very important to the public face of the Convention,” a vote was taken 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Id. 
80 See BARTHOLET & SMOLIN, supra note 7, at 241 (discussing the idea that alternative 
care including “high quality foster or institutional care” may be a preferred option to 
intercountry adoption). 
81 PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTEENTH SESSION 10 TO 29 MAY 1993, supra note 27, at 
472. 
82 Id. at 472–73. 
83 Id. at 298. The text of the proposal being “Bearing in mind that a child, for the full and 
harmonious development of his or her personality, should grow up in a family 
environment.” 
84 Id. at 473. 
85 Id. 
86 Id.  
87 Id. 
88 Id. One of these comments was from the Irish delegate who stated that the Preamble 
should use the full wording contained in the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
expressing a similar idea. This comment received no additional support. 
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and the proposal passed.89 Upon the conclusion of the vote, the chairman noted 
that the drafting committee would have to look at the Colombian and Indonesian 
proposals and redraft them to be in harmony with the rest of the Preamble.90 
Then, in the odd way that the mundane and the extremely important are so often 
intertwined, he remarked, “The rest of the world will judge the document, to an 
extent, on the contents of the Preamble.”91 
 At the following session, the delegate from Colombia presented a joint 
proposal of her country and Bolivia 92  recommending deletion of the third 
paragraph as it then existed 93  in favor of “[r]ecognizing that intercountry 
adoption may offer the advantage of a permanent family to a child who cannot 
find a suitable family in his or her country of origin.”94 This proposed language 
solidified the subsidiarity principle as a principle about “family” and not about 
“care.” The Colombian delegate then reminded the other delegates that a child’s 
right to a family is a fundamental right.95 The chairman called for a vote and the 
joint proposal passed; forever embodying a view of subsidiarity in the Hague 
Convention as one based, not on alternative care, but on the fundamental concept 
of family.96 
 From its earliest iterations 97  to its explanatory report, 98  the Hague 
Convention emphasized the importance of a permanent family. The reporter 
noted that the third paragraph of the Preamble, where the concept of subsidiarity 
is contained, does not deny other alternatives, “but highlights the importance of 
permanent family care as the preferred alternative to care by the child’s family of 




92 Id. at 478. 
93 Id. at 339. The paragraph placed emphasis on care as opposed to family focused 
reading, “Recognizing that intercountry adoption may offer the advantage of a permanent 
family to a child who cannot in any suitable manner be cared for in his or her country of 
origin.” 
94 Id. at 350.  
95 Id. at 478–79. The minutes for the Colombian delegate’s remarks were recorded in 
French and note “Elle rappelle que le droit à une famille pour un enfant est un droit 
fondamental et demande, en cas de rejet de la proposition de la Colombie et de la Bolivie, 
la suppression du paragraphe 3.” 
96 Id. at 479. 
97 Id. at 151. 
98 Id. at 553. 
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origin.”99 Importantly the focus is on family and not on care or nationality. The 
Colombian proposals helped to shape the Convention towards one that is focused 
on families rather than care.100 The idea is that for a child to be in a permanent 
family is better than “all forms of alternative care.”101 The subsidiarity principle 
and its history, as contained in the Preamble, by both what it includes and what it 
leaves out, confirms that in all instances family comes first.102 
C. Article 4( b) 
 The history of Article 4(b) is not as lively as that of the Preamble. As 
part of a comprehensive overview of adoption, the Van Loon Report,103 which 
served as a background document for the Hague Convention, attempted to 
accurately explain the subsidiarity principle.104 Van Loon noted that most child 
experts agreed that domestic adoption, when available, was preferable to 
intercountry adoption.105 Likewise, most child welfare experts did not agree with 
a view that Smolin seems to condone, which is that a child’s culture and society 
are of such importance that even institutionalization in a child’s home country is 
preferable to intercountry adoption.106 
 Against this backdrop, along with other preliminary documents107 and 
international instruments, including the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
the drafters of the Hague Convention began work on drafting an article on the 
subsidiarity principle. In the conclusions of the 1990 Special Commission, 
subsidiarity was listed as a fundamental principle and defined to include 
domestic adoption and in-country foster care ahead of intercountry adoption.108 
Although with less drama than the Preamble, the subsidiarity article of the Hague 
Convention also underwent changes that shifted it towards a family focus. 
 Despite the recommendations in the conclusions of the 1990 Special 
Commission, the first iteration of the Convention contained no mention of “foster 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 296, 298. 
101 Id. at 553 (emphasis added). 
102 Meaning that not only does biological family come before adoptive family, but 
adoptive family, no matter the location, comes before alternative forms of care. 
103 See PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTEENTH SESSION 10 TO 29 MAY 1993, supra note 27. 
104 See id. at 33, 55, 59, 93, 114, 119. 
105 Id. at 55. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 129.  
108 Id. 
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care.”109 The focus of the subsidiarity article, from the beginning, was on getting 
the child into a family. The comments from this early draft do indicate that the 
drafting committee felt it did not have enough time to fully discuss the 
subsidiarity article and recommended that the principle be more thoroughly 
developed.110  Fortunately over two years were available for the drafters to 
discuss, debate, and draft the subsidiarity article before the final version would be 
adopted.111 
 The second iteration of the subsidiarity article,112 altered the language 
found in the Illustrative Draft Articles to remove any references to care and 
redefine subsidiarity to focus more on the child’s interests in permanency.113 This 
version of the treaty allowed for an adoption to take place if “the competent 
authorities of the State of origin have determined, after possibilities for 
placement of the child within the State of origin have been given due 
consideration, that an intercountry adoption is in the child’s best interests.”114 
This version of the subsidiarity article would remain unaltered during the entire 
course of the drafting and was ultimately adopted verbatim into the Hague 
Convention.115 
 Three important considerations were the impetuses for the changes to the 
subsidiarity article and each illustrates the importance the drafters placed on the 
child’s right to a family. First, any reference to foster care was removed because 
it was seen as inappropriate.116 Second, the practical impossibility to ensure that 
all alternatives in the child’s country of origin had been exhausted in each 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Id. at 139. The Illustrative Draft Articles included an article on subsidiarity, which 
read that an adoption should only be granted if “the competent authorities of the State of 
origin have determined that no suitable alternative exists for the adoption or the 
placement of the child in the State of origin.” 
110 Id. at 145. 
111 See id. at 137 (noting that the date of the draft article is in December 1990). 
112 At the time this article was numbered as Article 4(b), although it would later appear in 
subsequent drafts as Article 5(b) before returning in the final version as Article 4(b). 
113 PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTEENTH SESSION 10 TO 29 MAY 1993, supra note 27, at 
153. 
114 Id. The superfluous use of the term “best interests” in the subsidiarity article may be 
the reason that such an emphasis is placed on it to the forgetting of the fact that the best 
interests principle is to govern all adoptions, both domestic and intercountry. 
115 Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry 
Adoption, supra note 18, at Art. 4(b). 
116 PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTEENTH SESSION 10 TO 29 MAY 1993, supra note 27, at 
161. 
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individual case led to the term “due consideration.” 117  Third, it was 
acknowledged that the best interests of the child may mean that in certain cases 
(such as a special handicap) a child may actually be better off adopted 
internationally even if there is a family in the country of origin willing to adopt 
the child.118  This third point belies the assertion that the exception in the 
subsidiarity principle is for a child to be kept in her home country in an 
institution instead of adopted abroad.119 In fact, the exception to subsidiarity 
supports the idea of concurrent planning since an intercountry adoption could, in 
some instances, prove to be better for the child than a domestic adoption.120 This 
version of the subsidiarity article was ultimately adopted without amendment or 
significant discussion.121 However, the battle over subsidiarity in the Preamble 
had not yet concluded at the time the subsidiarity article was adopted.122 The fact 
that the drafters were willing to agree on the language of the subsidiarity article, 
based on the explanations given by the committee that drafted it, before the 
details of the Preamble had been fully hammered out, illustrates both the 
complexity of drafting and the importance of the Preamble in helping define 
subsidiarity. 
 Even though the article appeared to be conclusively adopted, Egypt, after 
having failed to alter the language of the Preamble, made a last ditch effort to 
change the subsidiarity article and institute concessions for countries that do not 
recognize adoption.123 As in all previous occasions, Egypt’s proposal failed.124 
D. Subsidiarity as Adopted in the Hague Convention 
 As shocking as it may seem to some, the history and plain language of 
the subsidiarity principle can only lead to one conclusion: the language used in 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child was not followed. Where the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child clearly includes foster care as being higher 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 Id. It was noted that it would be practically impossible to ensure that all alternatives 
for placement in the country of origin had been exhausted. 
118 Id. 
119  See ELIZABETH BARTHOLET & DAVID SMOLIN, supra note 7, at 241 (Smolin 
contending that “in some instances” institutionalization may be better than an 
intercountry adoption by a willing family). 
120 See id. at 237 (Bartholet arguing that both intercountry and domestic adoptive homes 
should be looked for simultaneously). 
121 Id. at 369. 
122 Id. at 472. 
123 Id. at 480–81. 
124 Id.  
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up the child welfare ladder than intercountry adoption,125 the Hague Convention 
appears to have purposefully omitted the same language.126 Under the doctrine of 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius and the plain language of the subsidiarity 
principle, both the Preamble and Article 4(b) of the Hague Convention, to say 
nothing of explanatory reports by the actual drafters,127 must be interpreted as 
promoting permanent families. This includes viewing domestic and intercountry 
adoption as the preferred solution for children who cannot remain in the care of 
their biological parents. As in all legislation, but particularly so in international 
treaty making, divining a single and complete intent from multiple parties with 
varying interests is so difficult that a reliance on the plain language of the text is 
the surest way to correctly understand the document. 
 Both the Convention on the Rights of the Child128  and the Hague 
Convention129 hold that intercountry adoption should take place in compliance 
with the best interests of the child. Although the drafters were not explicit about 
the controversy130 surrounding the inclusion of foster care as clearly preferred to 
intercountry adoption, it stands to reason, based on the drafting history, that the 
drafters felt that non-permanent solutions, including foster care, would not 
generally fulfill the best interests principle. Thus, the Hague Convention appears 
to be a truer embodiment of the best interest principle because it clearly mandates 
that permanent solutions be given preference over temporary ones. In contrast, 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child ends up contradicting itself by 
requiring that adoption decisions be in the best interests of the child, but then 
proceeds to dictate that a non-permanent solution (i.e. foster care) be picked over 
a permanent solution (i.e. intercountry adoption).131  The Hague Convention 
avoids such contradictions by refraining from defining non-permanent solutions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 22, at Art. 21(b).  
126 See PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTEENTH SESSION 10 TO 29 MAY 1993, supra note 27, 
at 161 (refusing to use the term “foster care” because it was deemed inappropriate). 
127 See id. (discussing the fact that the exception to subsidiarity actually cuts in favor of 
the intercountry adoptive family and not an institution or other domestic placement, 
including adoption). 
128 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 22, at Art. 21(b). 
129 Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry 
Adoption, supra note 18, at Preamble. 
130 See PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTEENTH SESSION 10 TO 29 MAY 1993, supra note 27. 
131 See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 22, at Art. 21. 
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as preferable to permanent solutions.132 If subsidiarity were to be otherwise 
applied, it would violate the best interests principle in the vast majority of 
instances. 
 A subtle, yet important, difference in wording between the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child and the Hague Convention is also indicative. The 
Hague Convention rejected the concept of “care” found in the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child133  in favor of the concept of “family.”134  Whereas the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child would implement subsidiarity by stating 
that intercountry adoption should only follow when a child “cannot in any 
suitable manner be cared for in the child's country of origin,”135 the Hague 
Convention notes that intercountry adoption may offer “a permanent family to a 
child for whom a suitable family cannot be found in his or her State of origin.”136 
The contrast between the wording in these two conventions again illustrates that 
the Hague Convention made a more honest attempt to promote the best interests 
of the child, with an understanding that such interests will almost always dictate a 
permanent family as the best solution. 
 The reporter’s retelling of the drafting of the Hague Convention tries to 
assert that the omission of “foster care” in the subsidiarity principle was not all 
that important since States would still follow the subsidiarity principle as 
contained in the Convention on the Rights of the Child.137 In addition to running 
afoul of the best interests principle, such logic negates the fact that the Hague 
Convention is a specific instrument on intercountry adoption and is more recent 
than the Convention on the Rights of the Child. There were multiple 
opportunities to insert references to foster care or reformulate the subsidiarity 
article,138 but no such change or reformulation occurred. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry 
Adoption, supra note 18, at Preamble and Art. 4(b). 
133 See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 22, at Art. 21(b). 
134 Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry 
Adoption, supra note 18, at Preamble. 
135 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 22, at Art. 21(b). 
136 Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry 
Adoption, supra note 18, at Preamble. 
137 PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTEENTH SESSION 10 TO 29 MAY 1993, supra note 27, at 
199. 
138 Id.  
115                                      Chi.-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L.                 Vol. 
XVI 	  	  
	  
 Notably, the reporter also admitted that the subsidiarity principle was 
understood to embrace the idea that a child being in an adoptive family, 
regardless of location, “is the best option among all forms of alternative care”139 
(emphasis added). In this instance, as opposed to the discussion of the intent to 
follow the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the reporter is actually 
reporting on what a delegate and drafter of the Hague Convention had said. 
Unfortunately, many academics are quick to forget the words of the Hague 
Convention or of those who actually drafted it. Instead, they rely on the 
explanatory comments of the reporter and neglect to follow correct methods of 
legal interpretation.140 
 Ultimately, it is interesting that Article 4 b), which is looked to as the 
main explanation of the subsidiarity principle in the Hague Convention, 
underwent less change and debate than the Preamble’s explanation of 
subsidiarity. The two work in tandem and their history and drafting must also be 
taken together to fully comprehend what is meant by the subsidiarity principle in 
the Hague Convention. 
 Regrettably, even when looking at these two clauses together, there are 
still ambiguities about what the subsidiarity principle really entails. However, it 
is clear that the focus should be on family and permanency. 141  From the 
background documents142 to the end product, a view more akin to the one 
espoused by Elizabeth Bartholet, placing emphasis on permanent families, 
persisted. The only portion of Smolin’s view that appears correct is that a child 
should remain with her biological family where possible. On all other counts his 
view is rejected by the Hague Convention. Despite attempts to alter the principle, 
subsidiarity as drafted in the Hague Convention remained firmly focused on 
finding permanent families for children, with adoption, regardless of geography, 
being viewed as a better option than care that was legally less than adoption.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 Id. at 553. 
140 See CLAIRE FENTON-GLYNN, CHILDREN’S RIGHTS IN INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION: A 
EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 21 (2014) (relying on the comments of the explanatory report 
rather than looking to the actual text of the Hague Convention). 
141 See PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTEENTH SESSION 10 TO 29 MAY 1993, supra note 27, 
at 553. 
142 Id. at 55. 
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IV.        SUBSIDIARITY IN LIGHT OF ITS HISTORY 
 The subsidiarity principle as envisioned in the Hague Convention has a 
family focused hierarchy. The priority is for every child to remain in his or her 
family of origin as appropriate and possible. 143  This becomes particularly 
important in times of crisis,144 but applies at all times. Where the subsidiarity 
principle really comes into play is in the instances where a child can no longer 
remain in her family of origin.145 
 The language of the Hague Convention recognizes the need to find a 
“suitable family” in the State of origin when a child can no longer remain in her 
family of origin.146 After “possibilities for placement”147 —in the context of the 
history of the subsidiarity principle, permanent families148—in the country of 
origin are given “due consideration” then an intercountry adoption may take 
place.149 As Jorge Alberto Silva explained with reference to Mexican children 
being adopted abroad, “The treaty does not establish that Mexicans must be 
preferred to foreigners, but that one must first look for a home in the country of 
origin”150 (translation own). When adoption in the country of origin is not 
possible, or not preferable, an intercountry adoption is entirely appropriate. The 
Permanent Bureau’s Guide to Good Practice, although written long after the 
drafting of the Hague Convention, states that “[w]hile it is important to look for a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry 
Adoption, supra note 18, at Preamble. 
144 See HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 43, at Annex 
9, Annex 10 (reports from the Permanent Bureau and UNICEF, respectively, on children 
in crisis situations). 
145 There are questions about adoptability, consent, abandonment, and other issues that 
may make a child ineligible for adoption, but the focus here is on children that are 
eligible for intercountry adoption, as well as domestic alternatives to their biological 
families. 
146 Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry 
Adoption, supra note 18, at Preamble. 
147 Id. at Art. 4(b). 
148 Again noting that permanent families should be families with full legal rights and 
obligations. Such families are likely to only be possible through adoption. 
149 Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry 
Adoption, supra note 18, at Art. 4(b). 
150 Jorge Alberto Silva, El Impacto de los Convenios Internacionales sobre la Legislación 
Interna Mexicana Relativa a la Adopción Internacional de Menores (2011), 
http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/publica/rev/derpriv/cont/4/tci/tci7.htm. The text in 
Spanish reads “El tratado no establece que debía preferirse a los mexicanos sobre los 
extranjeros, sino que primero debe buscarle un hogar en su país de origen.” 
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home in the country of origin, a permanent home in another country would be 
preferable to a temporary home in the country of origin.”151 
 In light of the history of the subsidiarity principle in the Hague 
Convention, intercountry adoption should not be viewed as a last resort or as an 
option that must come after every domestic alternative. Indeed, foster care, other 
forms of care less than legal adoption, and institutionalization are all options that 
should not be considered until after attempts to find a domestic or intercountry 
adoptive family have failed.  
Foster care may be appropriate in instances where a domestic or 
intercountry adoption is not a possibility, but it should never be used as a tool to 
circumvent an adoption.152 This is particularly important since foster care is not a 
permanent solution and, except in atypical circumstances, cannot offer the same 
type of family environment that a child’s right to family entails. One country, in 
commenting on care for special needs children noted that “these [c]hildren do not 
get families. [T]hese [c]hildren are placed in foster homes.”153 This perception of 
foster care as unabashedly less than being in a family reinforces the need for 
permanent families to come before foster care and other alternative care 
solutions.  
Institutionalization, on the other hand, should never be viewed as a 
viable alternative, given the damaging effects it has on children. 154  Even 
UNICEF, an organization not known for its ardent support of intercountry 
adoptions, decries institutionalization “as a last resort” that should only be used 
“as a temporary measure.”155 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 43, at 114. 
152 Assuming that both the potential adoption and the foster care would be in the child’s 
best interest. 
153  Lesotho, Questionnaire No. 2 on the Practical Operation of the 1993 Hague 
Convention on Intercountry Adoption, question 14(c) (2014), available at 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/adop2015q2_ls.pdf. 
154  See, e.g., Dana E. Johnson, An Orphanage is Not a Family (Dec. 16, 2011), 
http://guatemala900.org/wp/?p=2572; Minnesota Medicine, Fostering Healthy Brains 
(March 2006), http://www.minnesotamedicine.com/Past-Issues/Past-Issues-2006/March-
2006/Pulse-Brain-March-2006; Dennis Drotar et al.,  
Early Psychological Outcomes in Failure to Thrive: Predictions from an Interactional 
Model 14 J. CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 105, (1985) (explaining the devastating effects an 
orphanage has on a child). 
155 HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 43, at Annex 10. 
Such a statement gives further credence to opposing the view of Smolin and others that 
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A. Exception to Subsidiarity 
 There is, however, an exception to the subsidiarity principle that is 
spelled out in the explanatory report.156 Those advocating under Smolin’s view 
argue that the exception to subsidiarity is in favor of the child staying in her 
home country to be able to enjoy the culture, language, and other aspects of life 
that can only be provided there even if an intercountry adoption is available and 
the domestic option is short of adoption.157 This view is unquestionably incorrect. 
The drafters of the Hague Convention reached a “consensus” that an exception to 
the subsidiarity principle, in certain circumstances, is possible.158 When there is 
cause (meaning that it is in the child’s best interests) for such an exception, a 
child that has an opportunity to be placed in a domestic adoption may in fact be 
adopted abroad.159 This is noted as being most likely to happen when the child is 
a relative of the family abroad or the child has a specific handicap and cannot 
adequately be taken care of in her home country.160 
There is most definitely an exception to the subsidiarity principle. Yet, 
this exception is not one that allows for a child to be placed in an institution or 
care that is less than a permanent family in lieu of being adopted abroad. Rather, 
the exception to the subsidiarity principle cuts in favor of intercountry adoption 
in certain instances, consistent with the overarching principles of the Hague 
Convention and its family centered focus. 
B. The Fallacy of Exhaustion 
 Unfortunately, along with the misconception of exceptions to the 
subsidiarity principle, there is also a popular fallacy that all domestic options 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
sometimes institutionalization is in the best interests of a child and is to be preferred over 
intercountry adoption in certain instances. 
156 PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTEENTH SESSION 10 TO 29 MAY 1993, supra note 27, at 
569. 
157 See ELIZABETH BARTHOLET & DAVID SMOLIN, supra note 7, at 241 (Smolin stating 
that institutionalization may be an exception to the subsidiarity principle in certain 
instances). 
158 PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTEENTH SESSION 10 TO 29 MAY 1993, supra note 27, at 
569. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. The full text of the paragraph detailing this exception to subsidiarity reads: 
“Notwithstanding the express acceptance of the subsidiarity principle, there was 
consensus that, in certain circumstances, the best interests of the child may require that he 
or she be placed for adoption abroad, even though there is a family available in the State 
of origin, for instance, in cases of adoption among relatives, or of a child with a special 
handicap and he or she cannot adequately be taken care of.” 
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must be exhausted (in other words, looked for and found unavailable) before an 
intercountry adoption can be considered.161 For example, a recent report from the 
Donaldson Adoption Institute repeatedly claims that all domestic permanency 
alternatives must be exhausted before an intercountry adoption can take place.162 
This is unequivocally incorrect. As noted above, there is an exception to 
subsidiarity that explicitly allows for an intercountry adoption to be preferred 
over a domestic adoption.163 Furthermore, the language of the Hague Convention 
itself makes it abundantly clear when it states that a child may be placed in 
intercountry adoption “after possibilities” for domestic adoption have been given 
“due consideration.”164 The text does not say “after all possibilities” or “after 
exhaustion of possibilities.”  
Indeed, the practical effect of reading into the Hague Convention the 
requirement that every possible chance be given for a domestic adoption to occur 
before considering intercountry adoption would almost certainly violate the best 
interests principle. After all, a child that is presently four-years-old and living in 
an institution may not be adopted now, but could potentially be adopted 
domestically in a year, two years, or ten years. However, there is no guarantee 
that such an adoption would take place. Meanwhile, an intercountry adoption 
may be available for the child. If exhaustion were required, more and more 
children would be subject to languishing indefinitely in orphanages because of 
the “possibility,” however remote, that one day they will be adopted within their 
country of origin. 
For these reasons, the Permanent Bureau’s Guide to Good Practice 
unambiguously states that the Hague Convention “does not require that all 
possibilities be exhausted.”165 To require such exhaustion would be “unrealistic” 
and “may delay indefinitely” the possibility of finding a permanent family for a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 See Ellen Pinderhughes et al., A Changing World: Shaping Best Practices through 
Understanding of the New Realities of Intercountry Adoption: A Policy & Practice 
Perspective, THE DONALDSON ADOPTION INSTITUTE 10, 59, 60, 61, 89 (2013), 
http://adoptioninstitute.org/old/publications/2013_10_AChangingWorld.pdf (noting that 
domestic options for permanency for children must be “exhausted” before an intercountry 
adoption can be considered). 
162 Id. 
163 PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTEENTH SESSION 10 TO 29 MAY 1993, supra note 27, at 
569. 
164 Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry 
Adoption, supra note 18, Art. 4(b). 
165 HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 43, at 29. 
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child166. The Guide to Good Practice also clarifies that even a search for relatives 
should “not unnecessarily prolong the period of institutional care for the 
child.”167 Consistent with the focus on permanent families and the overarching 
principles of the best interests of the child and a child’s right to a family, 
supported by the actual text of the Hague Convention and the history of the 
subsidiarity principle, any call for an exhaustion of possibilities in a child’s 
country of origin is incorrect, ludicrous, and damaging to children. 
CONCLUSION 
 The subsidiarity principle in the Hague Convention is found in both the 
Preamble and Article 4(b)168 and can only be correctly understood when looking 
at both together. Leading up to the drafting of the Hague Convention, 
background documents were prepared which tried to explain what subsidiarity 
was understood to encompass in that period of time.169 The drafters of the Hague 
Convention had these documents and others, including the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, available to them when drafting the Hague Convention. They 
deliberately declined to follow the language in the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child that would place foster care ahead of intercountry adoption, instead 
preferring to place emphasis and preference on permanent families.170 
 Multiple attempts were made to change the language of the subsidiarity 
principle,171 but the only ones that proved successful were those that shifted the 
principle towards being more focused on permanent families.172 The subsidiarity 
principle in the Hague Convention is focused on helping children find families, 
whether in their countries of origin or abroad. Forms of lesser care, including 
foster care, are to be seen as alternatives to permanent families, with 
institutionalization being, in every way, the last resort. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 73. 
168 Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry 
Adoption, supra note 18, at Preamble, Art. 4(b). 
169 PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTEENTH SESSION 10 TO 29 MAY 1993, supra note 27, at 
27. 
170 Id. at 161. 
171 See, e.g., id. at 243 (One of Egypt’s attempts to change the text of the subsidiarity 
principle). 
172 See id. at 350 (The Colombian and Bolivian proposal that ultimately became the text 
of the Hague Convention). 
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 Unfortunately, there is a raging debate about what the subsidiarity 
principle means,173 and misinterpretations174 and fallacies abound.175 Smolin and 
others advocating for children to be placed in non-permanent care ahead of 
intercountry adoptions have either not read the text of the Hague Convention 
alongside its drafting history or do not understand it. Permanent family solutions, 
including intercountry adoption, are clearly preferable to non-permanent 
solutions such as foster care, group homes, and institutionalization.176  
 Particular wording and reasoning in the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child was not followed by the Hague Convention. It appears that this was done 
to avoid contradictions and truly promote the best interests of the child by 
emphasizing permanent families over foster care and other forms of “suitable 
care.”177 
Through the forgoing detailed analysis of the history of the drafting of 
the subsidiarity principle, including discussion of what was and was not included 
and why, clarity should be brought to the debate on subsidiarity. The subsidiarity 
principle is about families. It is an expression of the idea that every child has a 
fundamental right to grow up in a loving and permanent family and that such is 
in the child’s best interests. No care situation that is short of a permanent family 
should be preferred over a permanent family, regardless of geographic 
location.178 The bottom line, as touted by child welfare advocates and the drafters 
of the Convention, is that every child deserves a family. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 See BARTHOLET & SMOLIN, supra note 7 (contending about the definition of the 
subsidiarity principle). 
174 Id. at 241. 
175  A Changing World: Shaping Best Practices through Understanding of the New 
Realities of Intercountry Adoption: A Policy & Practice Perspective, supra note 161, at 
10. 
176 There may be some exceptions, but in the vast majority of cases the best interests 
principle and the proper application of subsidiarity would require that a child be placed in 
a permanent family if such a family is available. 
177 Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 22, at Art. 21(b). 
178 Again, assuming that all options would comply with the best interests principle. 
